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                       OPINION OF THE COURT 
                                         
 
 
SLOVITER, Chief Judge.            
 
                                I. 
                              FACTS 
         The State of New Jersey, its governor, Christine Todd 
Whitman, Corrections Commissioner William H. Fauver and Education 
Commissioner Leo Klagholz (collectively New Jersey or the state) 
have sued the United States, Attorney General Janet Reno, 
Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service Doris 
Meissner, and Director of the Office of Management and Budget 
Alice Rivlin (collectively the United States) seeking 
compensation for costs incurred by New Jersey in incarcerating 
and educating illegal aliens.   
         New Jersey alleges that "[a]s a direct result of the 
federal government's failure to control its international borders 
and implement and abide by its laws, the State of New Jersey is 
improperly forced to bear the financial and administrative costs 
of imprisonment of illegal aliens who are convicted of crimes in 
New Jersey . . .[as well as the] costs of education of illegal 
aliens."  App. at 25.  These costs for state fiscal year 1994 
(ending June 30, 1994) are alleged to have been approximately 
$50.5 million for incarceration, App. at 26, and approximately 
$162 million for education, App. at 27.  New Jersey seeks a 
declaratory judgment that it has a right to reimbursement of 
these costs from the federal government, and an injunction and/or 
writ of mandamus requiring defendants to disburse funds from the 
United States Treasury to the state for these costs.  
         New Jersey grounds its eight count complaint on the 
following statutory and constitutional provisions: sections of 
the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 providing for the 
collection of penalties and expenses by the Attorney General and 
the reimbursement of states by the Attorney General for costs 
incurred for the imprisonment of illegal aliens convicted of 
state felonies, 8 U.S.C.  1330, 1365(a); the Invasion and 
Guarantee Clauses of Article IV,  4 of the U.S. Constitution; 
the Tenth Amendment; the Naturalization Clause of Article I,  8; 
the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment; and generalized 
principles of state sovereignty. 
          The district court granted the United States' motion 
to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), ruling that New Jersey's 
constitutional claims presented nonjusticiable political 
questions and that its statutory claims were not subject to 
judicial review under the Administrative Procedures Act.  This 
appeal followed.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.  1291 and 
our review is plenary. 
                               II.  
                            DISCUSSION 
         We note at the outset that five other states have also 
filed similar actions.  Each case has been dismissed by the 
district court under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) and in each of the two 
cases so far to have reached the appellate courts, the respective 
court of appeals has affirmed the dismissal.  See Texas v. United 
States, No. B-94-228 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 7, 1995), appeal pending, 
No. 95-40721 (5th Cir.); Arizona v. United States, No. 94-0866 
(D.Ariz. Apr. 18, 1995), appeal pending, No. 95-15980 (9th Cir.); 
Padavan v. United States, No. 94-CV-1341 (N.D.N.Y., Apr. 18, 
1995), affirmed, 82 F.3d 23 (2d Cir. 1996); California v. United 
States, No. 94-0674-K (S.D.Cal. Mar. 3, 1995), appeal pending, 
No. 95-55490 (9th Cir.); Chiles v. United States, 874 F.Supp. 
1334 (S.D.Fla. 1994), affirmed, 69 F.3d 1094 (11th Cir. 1995), 
cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 1674 (1996). 
                               A.  
                      Constitutional Claims 
         Plaintiffs present a number of novel constitutional 
claims.  We have considerable doubt as to whether these claims 
are even colorable, but, in any event, we agree with the district 
court's conclusion that they are non-justiciable.  Nonetheless, 
we examine each claim briefly in turn before considering the 
political question doctrine. 
1. Tenth Amendment 
         In its oral argument, New Jersey placed its principal 
focus on the Tenth Amendment.  In its complaint, New Jersey 
alleges that "[b]y forcing the taxpayers of the State of New 
Jersey to absorb the costs of incarcerating and educating illegal 
aliens, the United States . . . has usurped the taxpayers of the 
State of New Jersey of their rights, under the Tenth Amendment, 
to determine the manner in which their tax funds and State 
resources are expended."  App. at 31.   
         The Tenth Amendment makes explicit a fundamental 
precept of the governmental structure defined by our 
Constitution: that the federal government's powers are limited to 
those enumerated.  Thus, those "powers not delegated to the 
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the 
States, are reserved to the States respectively or to the 
people." U.S. Const. amend. X.   
         As interpreted by the Supreme Court, the federal 
government, which has considerable power to regulate individuals 
directly and to encourage states to adopt certain legislative 
programs by, for example, attaching conditions to the receipt of 
federal funds, cannot require the states to govern according to 
its instructions.  Thus "Congress may not simply 'commandee[r] 
the legislative processes of the States by directly compelling 
them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program.'"  New 
York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161 (1992) (quoting Hodel v. 
Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 
288 (1981)).   
          In the decision in New York, the Court held that a 
federal statute that required states either to regulate the 
disposal of radioactive waste pursuant to Congress' direction or 
take title and possession of radioactive wastes generated within 
their borders "crossed the line distinguishing encouragement from 
coercion."  505 U.S. at 175.  Either option -- whether adoption 
of Congress' regulatory scheme or taking title to radioactive 
wastes -- required a state to govern according to Congress' 
instructions.  Because either option standing alone would be 
beyond Congress' authority, "it follows that Congress lacks the 
power to offer the States a choice between the two."  Id. at 176.  
         In contrast, here the federal government has issued no 
directive to the State of New Jersey.  Neither the state's 
incarceration of illegal aliens nor its obligation to educate 
illegal aliens results from any command by Congress.  The state 
has made its own decision to prosecute illegal aliens for acts 
they committed in violation of New Jersey's own criminal code and 
its education of illegal aliens does not derive from any 
Congressional or executive directive, but from the Constitution 
itself, as construed by the Supreme Court in Plyer v. Doe, 457 
U.S. 202, 230 (1982).   
         The state seeks to add another link to the causal 
chain, asserting that it is not simply the state's criminal code 
or its constitutional obligations that have caused it to make the 
large expenditures it complains of, but rather the federal 
government's failure to adequately enforce the immigration laws.  
But no precedent suggests that inaction by Congress or the 
Executive Branch constitutes the kind of coercion that violates 
the Tenth Amendment.  As defendants succinctly state in their 
brief, "[t]he Tenth Amendment provides a shield against the 
federal exercise of powers reserved to the states, not a sword to 
compel federal action."  Appellees' Brief at 25.  See Padavan,  
82 F.3d at 28-29 (rejecting similar Tenth Amendment claim by New 
York State).    
2. Naturalization Clause 
         One of Congress' specifically enumerated powers under 
Article I, section 8 of the Constitution is "To establish an 
uniform Rule of Naturalization."  Count VI of the complaint 
alleges that because power over immigration matters has thus been 
delegated to the federal government, "the State of New Jersey is 
powerless to effectively resolve the economic problems caused by 
the invasion of illegal immigrants into the State," and it 
further alleges that defendants, in failing to implement their 
laws and policies, have "forced the State of New Jersey, to bear 
the burden of a responsibility which is that of the Nation as a 
whole pursuant to [the Naturalization Clause]."  App. at 33.   
         Beyond its conclusory statement that "[t]his 
encroachment upon the resources of the State of New Jersey is 
constitutionally violative and impermissibly infringes upon the 
fundamental right of the State to determine proper allocation of 
its resources," id., New Jersey offers no reason why 
Congressional action pursuant to a power delegated to Congress by 
the Constitution that results in the indirect imposition of some 
cost on the states is an unconstitutional infringement on state 
sovereignty.  Such an argument is even more tenuous in light of 
the Court's decision in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan 
Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985), where the Court upheld 
the imposition of minimum wage and overtime requirements of the 
Fair Labor Standards Act on a local public mass-transit 
authority, a far more direct congressional imposition of cost.  
It follows that there is no basis for a claim that the 
Constitution has been violated by the federal government's 
inaction, which allegedly has set in motion events that have 
indirectly caused the state to incur costs.  See Padavan, 82 F.3d 
at 26-27 (rejecting same claim by New York).  In light of the 
Supreme Court's reluctance to read affirmative governmental 
duties into the Constitution, see, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago 
County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989), we see no 
ground on which we could read into the Naturalization Clause an 
affirmative duty on the part of the federal government to protect 
states from harm caused by illegal aliens, who are non- 
governmental third parties.   
3. Takings Clause 
         In one of its separate counts, New Jersey alleges that 
the federal government, by forcing the state to expend state tax 
funds and revenues to incarcerate and educate illegal aliens, has 
taken its property without just compensation in violation of the 
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.     
         Although New Jersey correctly notes that the Takings 
Clause has been construed to apply to the federal government's 
condemnation of land owned by state and local governments, United 
States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 31 (1984), it cites no 
case that has extended that holding to encompass government 
action or inaction which has an adverse impact on a state's tax 
revenues. 
         The Supreme Court has avoided expounding any "set 
formula" for determining when governmental action constitutes a 
taking, instead "engag[ing] in . . . essentially ad hoc, factual 
inquiries," Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 
1003, 1015 (1992) (quoting Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York 
City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)).  Relevant considerations include 
"[t]he economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and . . 
. the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct 
investment-backed expectations." Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.  
Also relevant is the nature of the action, such as whether it is 
a physical invasion of land and thus more likely to constitute a 
taking, or a "public program adjusting the benefits and burdens 
of economic life to promote the common good," which ordinarily 
will not be compensable.  Id.  The Court has made clear that 
"government may execute laws or programs that adversely affect 
recognized economic values," id., and has thus "dismissed 
`taking' challenges on the ground that, while the challenged 
government action caused economic harm, it did not interfere with 
interests that were sufficiently bound up with the reasonable 
expectations of the claimant to constitute `property' for Fifth 
Amendment purposes."  Id. at 124-25. 
         We have no hesitancy in concluding that the federal 
government's alleged failure to stem the tide of illegal 
immigrants into the State of New Jersey, while it may have had 
the incidental effect of causing the state to incur additional 
law enforcement and education costs, did not interfere with the 
state's "investment-backed" and "reasonable expectations" and 
thus is not a taking of state property for purposes of the Fifth 
Amendment.  
4. Invasion Clause 
         In Count III New Jersey alleges that the failure of the 
United States to prevent the entry of illegal aliens into that 
state violates the federal government's obligation under the 
Constitution to "protect each of [the states] against Invasion."  
U.S. Const. art. IV,  4.  It offers no support whatsoever for 
application of the Invasion Clause to this case or for its 
reading of the term "invasion" to mean anything other than a 
military invasion.  See Padavan, 82 F.3d at 28 ("In order for a 
state to be afforded the protections of the Invasion Clause, it 
must be exposed to armed hostility from another political entity, 
such as another state or foreign country that is intending to 
overthrow the state's government." (citing The Federalist No. 43 
(James Madison))).   
         Although it is not entirely clear from either its 
complaint or brief, the state also appears to be including in the 
same count a claim under the Guarantee Clause of Article IV,  4.  
That clause provides that "The United States shall guarantee to 
every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government," and 
may be implicated by New Jersey's allegation that "the 
sovereignty and independence of the State of New Jersey has been 
contravened" because of the actions (or inaction) of the federal 
government.  App. at 30.  New Jersey's complaint makes no 
specific allegation indicating how the state's republican form of 
government is threatened or compromised by defendants' actions 
(or inaction), and certainly the fact that the state "has been 
forced to increase and expend state taxes," App. at 29, cannot be 
said to "pose any realistic risk of altering the form or the 
method of functioning of [the state's] government," see New York, 
505 U.S. at 186.   
5. Intrusion into Fundamental Sovereignty of State 
         Without citing to any particular constitutional 
provision, New Jersey makes the generalized claim that the 
Constitution "provides, with certain well-defined exceptions, 
that the federal government may not intrude on the fundamental 
sovereignty of a State" and that defendants have violated this 
principle by "failing to implement and enforce its laws," 
permitting "the invasion of illegal aliens into the State," and 
refusing "to provide reimbursement for the cost of incarcerating 
and educating them."  App. at 32.  This claim adds nothing to the 
claims we have already found to be without merit.  We note the 
applicability of the Supreme Court's observation that "[s]tate 
sovereign interests . . . are more properly protected by 
procedural safeguards inherent in the structure of the federal 
system than by judicially created limitations on federal power." 
Garcia, 469 U.S. at 552. 
6. Absence of remedy through the political process 
         Finally, in another claim not grounded in any 
particular constitutional provision, New Jersey asserts it is 
entitled to judicial relief because it "has no remedy through the 
political process established by the Constitution of the United 
States to seek reimbursement," and "has exhausted all other 
political and practical remedies, and any further efforts would 
be futile."  App. at 34-35.  Presumably the state is alluding to 
the Supreme Court's statement in South Carolina v. Baker, 485 
U.S. 505 (1988), that its previous opinion in Garcia had "left 
open the possibility that some extraordinary defects in the 
national political process might render congressional regulation 
of state activities invalid under the Tenth Amendment."  Id. at 
512.  In view of the absence of any allegation that New Jersey 
"was deprived of any right to participate in the national 
political process or that it was singled out in a way that left 
it politically isolated and powerless," id. at 513, New Jersey 
has alleged no viable claim.   
7. Political Question Doctrine 
         The district court held that all of New Jersey's 
constitutional claims were nonjusticiable under the political 
question doctrine.  In Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), the 
Supreme Court identified six factors, any one of which indicates 
the presence of a political question.  In this case, the district 
court found at least three of these factors were present: 1) "a 
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to 
a coordinate political department," 2) "a lack of judicially 
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it," and 3) 
"the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent 
resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate 
branches of government."  Id. at 217.  
         As to the first factor referred to above, even though 
not "every case or controversy which touches foreign relations 
lies beyond judicial cognizance," id. at 211, we agree with the 
Second Circuit that the Naturalization Clause represents "a 
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment" of immigration 
to the legislative branch.  Padavan, 82 F.3d at 27.  
         The second factor cited by the district court finds 
support in the Supreme Court's cases that "'have long recognized 
the power to expel or exclude aliens as a fundamental sovereign 
attribute exercised by the Government's political departments 
largely immune from judicial control.'"  Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 
787, 792 (1977) (quoting Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210 
(1953)).  As the Court has explained:  
         For reasons long recognized as valid, the 
         responsibility for regulating the relationship between 
         the United States and our alien visitors has been 
         committed to the political branches of the Federal 
         Government.  Since decisions in these matters may 
         implicate our relations with foreign powers, and since 
         a wide variety of classifications must be defined in 
         the light of changing political and economic 
         circumstances, such decisions are frequently of a 
         character more appropriate to either the Legislature or 
         the Executive than to the Judiciary. 
 
Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 (1976) (footnote omitted).   
         Finally, each of New Jersey's claims asserted under the 
Constitution would require a court to evaluate the formulation 
and implementation of immigration policy by the executive branch.  
Decisions about how best to enforce the nation's immigration laws 
in order to minimize the number of illegal aliens crossing our 
borders patently involve policy judgments about resource 
allocation and enforcement methods.  Such issues fall squarely 
within a substantive area clearly committed by the Constitution 
to the political branches; they are by their nature peculiarly 
appropriate to resolution by the political branches of government 
both because there are no "judicially discoverable and manageable 
standards for resolving" them and because independent resolution 
of such issues by a court would express a lack of the respect due 
a coordinate branch of government.  Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.    
         Accordingly, we see no error in the district court's 
dismissal of plaintiffs' constitutional claims as non- 
justiciable.  Our holding is consistent with those of the other 
courts of appeals dismissing similar claims on this ground.  SeePadavan, 
82 F.3d at 27-28 (Guarantee and Naturalization Clauses); 
Chiles, 69 F.3d at 1097 (Invasion and Guarantee Clauses and Tenth 
Amendment).   
                               B.  
                         Statutory Claims 
         New Jersey asserts, in addition, several statutory 
claims.  It alleges that defendants have violated 8 U.S.C.  
1365(a), which provides: "Subject to the amounts provided in 
advance in appropriation Acts, the Attorney General shall 
reimburse a State for the costs incurred by the State for the 
imprisonment of any illegal alien or Cuban national who is 
convicted of a felony by such State."  New Jersey contends that 
portions of Congress' fiscal year 1994 lump-sum appropriation of 
over a billion dollars ($1,048,538,000) to the Attorney General 
for INS administration and enforcement should have been allocated 
to reimbursing New Jersey under  1365.  This appropriation was 
designated for "salaries and expenses."  Pub.L. No. 103-121, 107 
Stat. 1160 (1993). 
         As a separate claim New Jersey also alleges violation 
of 8 U.S.C.  1330, which authorizes the Attorney General to 
recover fines, penalties and expenses from persons violating 
immigration laws.  The state does not allege that the Attorney 
General has failed to collect such monies; rather, it appears to 
contend that monies collected under this section should also be 
used by the United States to reimburse New Jersey.  Since this 
statute does not impose any such obligation on the federal 
government, presumably this claim is intended to be construed in 
conjunction with the state's other claims. 
         The district court held that plaintiffs' statutory 
claims are not subject to judicial review under the 
Administrative Procedures Act (APA), 5 U.S.C.  701, 702.  The 
APA waives the sovereign immunity of the United States and allows 
for judicial review of federal agency actions in certain 
circumstances.  5 U.S.C.  702.  Such review is not available, 
however, where such action "is committed to agency discretion by 
law."  Id.  701(a)(2). 
         In Lincoln v. Vigil, 113 S.Ct. 2024 (1993), on which 
the district court relied, the Court considered a challenge to a 
decision by the Indian Health Service to discontinue the Indian 
Children's Program, which the Service had been providing for 
seven years but which was neither mandated nor specifically 
authorized by statute.  The relevant statutes spoke only in 
general terms, authorizing the Service to expend funds 
appropriated by Congress for "the benefit, care, and assistance 
of Indians" and for the "relief of distress and conservation of 
health."  113 S.Ct. at 2027-28 (quoting the Snyder Act, 25 U.S.C. 
 13).  The relevant appropriations acts did not mention the 
Indian Children's program.  Under these circumstances, the 
Supreme Court held that an agency's allocation of funds from a 
lump-sum appropriation is a decision "committed to agency 
discretion" and therefore unreviewable.   
         New Jersey argues that Lincoln is inapposite because 8 
U.S.C.  1365, referred to above, is a specific statutory  
provision authorizing the appropriation it seeks.  However, the 
reimbursement authorized under that statute is qualified by the 
phrase, "[s]ubject to the amounts provided in advance in 
appropriation acts."  A general lump sum appropriation to the INS 
does not constitute a specific mandatory requirement of 
reimbursement.  Furthermore, Congress knows how to make an 
appropriation under  1365 if it wants to.  For fiscal year 1995 
Congress made a specific appropriation of 130 million dollars for 
reimbursing states under  1365.  See Pub. L. No. 103-317, 108 
Stat. 1724, 1778 (1994).   
         Accordingly, since none of the $1,048,538,000 lump sum 
appropriation for INS "salaries and expenses" nor the monies 
recovered under  1330 were earmarked by Congress in fiscal year 
1994 for disbursement under  1365, the decision as to whether to 
appropriate any of those funds for that purpose is one "committed 
to agency discretion" and therefore unreviewable under the APA, 5 
U.S.C.  701(a)(2).   
         Plaintiffs argue in their brief to this court that they 
are also entitled to relief under 8 U.S.C.  1252(i).  However, 
as this claim was not raised in the complaint, nor, apparently, 
in plaintiffs' briefs to the district court, it is not properly 
before this court.  Harris v. City of Philadelphia, 35 F.3d 840, 
845 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 
                               III. 
                            CONCLUSION 
         For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of 
the district court. 
 
 
